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China’s Efforts to Boost Birth Rates Face Criticism, Struggle to Gain Traction

At a recent wedding expo in Changsha, China, bright pink neon signs with phrases like “Having three children is the best” reflected the government’s growing urgency to boost marriage and birth rates amid an aging population and declining births. However, the low turnout and backlash on social media suggest that the government’s traditionalist messaging may be missing the mark with modern audiences, especially women.

The expo featured hands-on activities for couples, such as experiencing simulated childbirth pain and practicing parenting skills, as part of the government’s broader attempt to promote family life. Yet, slogans reinforcing gender roles — “Housework is the best” and “Best at raising kids” — have drawn widespread criticism online. Many saw the language as outdated and sexist. “All the slogans seem directed at women. Isn’t sharing housework the right thing to do?” commented one Weibo user. Another on Xiaohongshu claimed the expo “probably persuaded a lot of hesitant people to give up marriage.”

Government figures show that marriage registrations dropped 16.6% in the first three quarters of 2024 compared to the previous year, indicating that young people are increasingly delaying or forgoing marriage altogether. This trend has alarmed officials, prompting Beijing to urge local governments to promote marriage and childbirth with policies like improved maternity leave, childcare support, and housing incentives for larger families. However, these policies lack detailed funding plans, and many experts doubt their effectiveness without significant changes in work culture and gender equality.

The government’s recent actions reflect a growing anxiety over demographic decline. In 2015, China ended its one-child policy, yet birth rates have continued to fall, reaching record lows last year. Some local governments have resorted to tactics like cold-calling women to promote pregnancy and offering free vitamins, which have done little to sway public opinion. Shanghai resident Aiqi, 32, dismissed the latest measures as inadequate, citing high costs and systemic pressures. “We need to change the competitive education system, the high-intensity work environment, and the high cost of housing,” she noted.

Experts believe that economic constraints may hinder the effectiveness of Beijing’s policies. According to demographer Yi Fuxian, the long-term costs of raising a child mean that debt-burdened local governments have little incentive to encourage childbirth. Research from the Yuwa Population Research Center suggests that stabilizing China’s population would require an investment of 10% of the country’s GDP. While similar policies have had success in Western countries like France and Sweden, they’ve struggled in East Asia, largely due to persistent gender inequality. China’s ranking of 107th in the World Economic Forum’s gender gap index places it far behind nations like South Korea and Japan, both of which have also struggled to raise birth rates despite policy interventions.

Sociologists like Yun Zhou of the University of Michigan argue that top-down policies rarely shift individual choices on family planning. “Measures that tell people to have more children are rarely effective,” she said. This sentiment was echoed by Weibo user Yuxiao, who criticized the festival’s focus on gendered expectations. “Treat girls as human beings and respect them,” Yuxiao wrote. “Many don’t want to marry in the first place, and now there’s added pressure on them and their families to have children.”

The marriage expo in Changsha will continue to run every weekend through November, but the mixed reactions highlight a widening gap between policy goals and public sentiment. For many, China’s approach seems disconnected from the lived realities of modern Chinese families, raising questions about the future effectiveness of government efforts to reverse the demographic decline.

Kim Jong Un’s Deteriorating Relationship with China Amidst Growing Alliance with Russia

Chinese tourists huddle against the brisk autumn breeze on a 12-storey building in Fangchuan, the northeastern tip of China where the borders with Russia and North Korea converge. Standing at this unique location, one woman proudly declares her proximity to both nations: “I feel very proud to be standing here… with Russia on my left and North Korea on my right. There are no borders among the people.” However, such optimism may overlook the geopolitical tensions that lie beneath the surface.

China finds itself caught between its sanctioned neighbors as fears rise regarding the burgeoning alliance between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un. Recent reports suggest North Korea may be sending thousands of troops to bolster Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This was further underscored when Pyongyang launched a banned intercontinental missile last Thursday, escalating tensions in the region. Christopher Green, an analyst from the International Crisis Group, emphasizes that “China seeks a relationship with a reasonable, high level of control over North Korea,” yet the emerging ties between Pyongyang and Moscow threaten to undermine that stability.

While both Moscow and Pyongyang deny that North Korean soldiers are being deployed to Ukraine, U.S. officials assert they have evidence of such movements, following intelligence claims from South Korea and Ukraine. These developments emerged just prior to Xi Jinping’s meeting with Putin at the Brics summit earlier this October, overshadowing a gathering intended to showcase a united front against the West.

Beijing’s frustrations with the current trajectory of its allies are palpable. “China is unhappy with the way things are going,” Green observes, noting that the nation is trying to keep its discontent relatively quiet. In Fangchuan, the presence of tourists is tolerated, but journalists face scrutiny, with the police closely monitoring their activities.

Many tourists visiting the border area express intrigue about North Korea. Through telescopes, they spy cyclists in the hermit kingdom, often captivated by its mysterious aura. This proximity highlights how intertwined the fates of the three nations have become, with China’s economy heavily reliant on North Korea, which relies on Beijing for over 90% of its foreign trade.

Historically, relations between China and North Korea have fluctuated. In the early 1960s, Chinese families fled across the Tumen River into North Korea. However, following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, North Korea’s economy crumbled, and the regime increasingly relied on China. Yet now, with Russia offering an alternative ally, Kim Jong Un is leveraging this relationship for North Korea’s benefit.

Aidan Foster-Carter, a longtime observer of North Korea, describes the situation as a shift in allegiances, with Kim being characterized as “the comrade from hell” to both Russia and China. Analysts note that Kim has shown more affection towards Putin than Xi in recent months, even meeting with the Russian leader twice in the past year, while avoiding any engagement with Xi since 2019.

As North Korea strengthens its ties with Russia, Kim’s actions may be alienating his traditional benefactor, China. The Kremlin’s needs align with Pyongyang’s ambitions, creating a precarious partnership that could further destabilize the region. Xi, who is striving for stability and a new global order, finds himself in a difficult position, unable to control the unfolding alliance between his two neighbors.

The recent developments have led to discussions between the U.S. and China regarding the situation. While Beijing has previously complied with international sanctions against North Korea, the current circumstances are pushing Xi to weigh his options more carefully. As the situation unfolds, any drastic measures could lead to a refugee crisis at the Chinese border, a scenario that Beijing is keen to avoid.

Ultimately, Kim Jong Un faces a pivotal decision as well. While Russia may currently provide military support, it is China that has historically sustained North Korea’s regime. The delicate balance between maintaining these alliances will have significant implications not just for the leaders but for the millions of North Koreans who rely on the regime for their survival.

 

China’s New Aircraft Carrier Sparks Interest Amid Naval Expansion

Recent satellite imagery indicates that China is constructing a new and unusual type of aircraft carrier at Guangzhou Shipyard International on Longxue Island in Guangdong province. This vessel, which features a large, open flat top, has caught the attention of military experts due to its atypical design and smaller size compared to China’s existing naval carriers.

Thomas Shugart, a former U.S. Navy submarine commander and fellow at the Center for a New American Security, remarked that this potential new aircraft carrier is “somewhat unusual” in shape and size, making it smaller than the Type 075 amphibious assault ships currently in service. Shugart speculated that it may be the world’s first “ostensibly civilian ‘aircraft carrier’ used as an oceanographic research vessel.”

The report about this new vessel first emerged from The War Zone, which highlighted China’s accelerating production of advanced warships, often rivaling U.S. carrier technology. Earlier this year, China’s most formidable aircraft carrier to date, the Fujian, underwent sea trials, with expectations that it could be operational by 2026. The Fujian, displacing 80,000 tons, surpasses the PLAN’s existing carriers, the 66,000-ton Shandong and the 60,000-ton Liaoning, placing it alongside the supercarriers operated solely by the U.S. Navy.

In addition to these developments, China is also making strides in constructing the world’s largest amphibious assault ship, the Type 076, which features an expansive flight deck comparable to the area of three U.S. football fields. This rapid naval expansion has propelled China’s fleet to over 340 warships, making it the largest navy globally.

The construction of this new aircraft carrier-type vessel may reflect China’s broader “military-civil fusion strategy,” which aims to integrate civilian and military capabilities. Shugart noted that such a vessel could enhance the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s operational and logistical capabilities, particularly in low-threat environments.

Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, suggested that the vessel could serve as a helicopter or drone carrier for the China Coast Guard, which increasingly acts as a quasi-military force. This new capability would enhance the Coast Guard’s surveillance operations in distant waters, particularly in the South China Sea and near Taiwan.

China’s military presence around Taiwan has intensified, with recent large-scale drills demonstrating unprecedented involvement from Coast Guard vessels in the region. Schuster remarked that the new vessel could significantly support Coast Guard operations, especially in quarantine enforcement.

Beyond military applications, the vessel could also play a role in humanitarian efforts, facilitating rapid relief and evacuation in non-combat situations or serving as a logistics support ship in amphibious operations.

Additionally, in a display of its growing naval capabilities, the Liaoning and Shandong carriers recently conducted their first-ever dual-carrier exercise in the South China Sea. This operation, described by state-run Xinhua news service, involved coordinated movements of fighter jets and support ships, aiming to enhance the combat capabilities of China’s aircraft carrier formations.

Experts believe that the collaboration between the Liaoning and Shandong carriers demonstrates the PLA Navy’s increasing complexity and coordination, potentially enabling more sophisticated fleet operations in the future.